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Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality
Jernej Cˇopicˇ and Clara Ponsat´ı ∗
December 23, 2015
Abstract
A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an in-
divisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are
payoﬀ equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.
1 Introduction
A seller and a buyer with private information bargaining over an indivisible item is a
most fundamental market interaction. It leads to questions of pricing, aggregation of
private information and eﬃciency. Ultimately, what is the set of pricing mechanisms,
which are incentive compatible, feasible, robust to the details of traders’ information,
and, while satisfying these requirements, as eﬃcient as possible (optimal)? A trading
mechanism is robust if it satisﬁes ex post incentive compatibility, balanced budget
and individual rationality, and it is optimal if it satisﬁes an appropriate Pareto
criterion.1 Under the assumption that the two traders are risk neutral, we answer
this question: such pricing mechanisms are equivalent to non-wasteful randomized
posted prices.
A randomized posted price is a common and intuitive mechanism. There is a
ﬁxed probability distribution over prices and a price is drawn from that distribution.
∗Corresponding author: Jernej Cˇopicˇ, jcopic@econ.ucla.edu. Cˇopicˇ is at UCLA and Caltech,
Ponsat´ı is at the University of St Andrews. This paper was formerly a part of our paper titled
“Ex-Post Constrained-Eﬃcient Bilateral Trade with Risk-Averse Traders,” [9], the part presented
here addresses the case of risk neutrality. We are grateful to Chris Helwig, three anonymous referees
and to Emily and Melinda Wang for their typesetting assistance. Cˇopicˇ is grateful to the Economics
Faculty at the University of Ljubljana for their hospitality during Winter 2015.
1In their seminal study, [3] provide a foundation for using ex post incentive compatibility as a
suitable notion for robustness. In environments with two agents, ex post incentive compatibility is
equivalent to interim implementability on every type space. In private values environments, ex post
incentive compatibility of a direct revelation mechanism is equivalent to incentive compatibility in
dominant strategies. See also [14] and [7]. A suitable notion of Pareto optimality is the ex post
constrained optimality, deﬁned by [8], which is discussed in more detail below.
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Each trader then announces whether or not he is willing to trade at that price, which
presumably depends on the trader’s private valuation of the item. Trade is eﬀected
if both traders agree to trade, otherwise no trade takes place. A randomized posted
price is non-wasteful if prices at which at least one of the traders would never trade
occur with zero probability. Posted prices are commonly used in the real world
and albeit in more complex settings, [2] suggest that price dispersion can at least
to some extent be viewed as pure randomization, see also, e.g., [13]. In the present
context, randomized posted prices have been studied by [11], who gave some technical
conditions (diﬀerentiability of prices and allocations, deterministic mechanisms, and
mechanisms, which are step functions), under which robust trading mechanisms are
characterized by (non-wasteful) randomized posted prices. As an auxilliary result,
we use a diﬀerent approach to prove their claim in general. This then allows us to
apply a suitable notion of optimality and characterize the optimal robust trading
mechanisms.2,3
It is quite evident that a randomized posted price satisﬁes ex post incentive
compatibility, balanced budget and individual rationality, i.e., it is a robust trading
mechanism. By misrepresenting his private valuation, for example by saying “no” to
trade when the realized price would have made it proﬁtable, a trader can only lose
opportunities to make a proﬁt while such misrepresentation brings no potential gains.
But it is much less obvious that any pricing mechanism satisfying these properties
is equivalent to a randomized posted price. Consider the mechanism whereupon
reports v = (v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)2, the traders trade at a price p(v) with a probability
ϕ(v), and with probability 1− ϕ(v) there is no trade,4 where,
p(v) =
{
v1+v2
2
, if v1 ≤ v2
0, otherwise
; ϕ(v) =
{
α(v2 − v1), if v1 ≤ v2
0, otherwise
; α ∈ (0, 1]. (1)
It is immediate to check that this mechanism is incentive compatible.5 When α = 1,
this mechanism is equivalent to a randomized posted price whereby the price is
2Other related recent advances in bilateral trade concern weakly undominated strategies, see
[18] and [5].
3In a very diﬀerent setting of an exchange economy with a much richer domain of preferences,
[1] prove that dominant-strategy incentive compatible social choice functions are characterized by
trading at a ﬁnite number of pre-speciﬁed proportions, a result that is similar in spirit.
4Note that this parametrization is diﬀerent from the parametrization in, e.g., [16], where a direct
revelation mechanism is parametrized by the probability of trade and the expected transfer. That
parametrization was then adopted by [11]. When one considers ex post individual rationality and
budget balance, the price conditional on trade taking place seems more intuitive and suggests a
diﬀerent proof for the general characterization result.
5Suppose that the seller has a valuation v1, reports v˜1, and to keep this illustration simple, assume
that the report of the buyer is v2 ≥ v˜1. Then the seller’s expected utility is α(v2− v˜1)
(
v˜1+v2
2 − v1
)
,
which is a quadratic expression that is maximized at v˜1 = v1, for any α ∈ (0, 1]. It is quite obvious
that this mechanism is individually rational and requires no external subsidies.
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uniformly distributed over (0, 1) – under each of the two mechanisms each trader
obtains the same payoﬀ for every realization of valuations. Indeed, ϕ(v) is then the
probability that the realized price is in the interval (v1, v2), when v2 > v1, and p(v)
is the conditional expected price, i.e., the expected price, conditional on trade taking
place. When α < 1, this mechanism is wasteful : since the traders’ valuations come
from the interval (0, 1), 1 − α represents the probability mass assigned to price 0,
or any other price at which traders would never trade, and that is wasteful. One
might be tempted to think that this example is somewhat special and that it might
be easy to ﬁnd robust trading mechanisms which cannot be represented in this way.
In Proposition 1 we use a measure-theoretic approach to prove that any incentive
compatible and feasible mechanism can be represented by a randomized (possibly
wasteful) posted price.
The question looms whether the pricing mechanism in (1) is as eﬃcient as a
robust trading mechanism can be. Implicit in this question is a suitable criterion for
optimality. When α < 1, i.e., the mechanism is wasteful, the answer is certainly no
– if instead α = 1, both traders will be better oﬀ for any vector of valuations and
strictly better oﬀ for any valuations in the set v2 > v1. Hence, the robust trading
mechanism with α = 1 ex post Pareto dominates the robust trading mechanism with
α < 1. This ex post Pareto dominance is what deﬁnes our eﬃciency criterion, i.e.,
a robust trading mechanism is optimal if there does not exist any robust trading
mechanism which ex post Pareto dominates it. This notion of ex post constrained
eﬃciency is relatively weak but that is not surprising: robustness requires that the
details of the distribution of traders’ private parameters should not matter much so
that in order to dominate some other mechanism, a given mechanism must dominate
it for a variety of diﬀerent beliefs or type spaces, which then deﬁnes the notion
of constrained optimality and durability for robust environments.6 Of course, the
argument above does not prove that with α = 1 the mechanism (1) is optimal –
there may in principle be some entirely diﬀerent mechanism dominating it. The
optimality of (1) is best illustrated by considering two diﬀerent deterministic posted
prices, p, p′ ∈ (0, 1). It is clear that neither ex post dominates the other as the
two traders will trade at diﬀerent valuations and the gains from trade will also be
allocated diﬀerently. Along with Proposition 1 this argument yields our main result,
Theorem 1, that a robust trading mechanism is optimal if and only if it is equivalent
to a non-wasteful randomized posted price.
6See [8] for a detailed argument and further examples. This notion of optimality is also closely
related to the ex post incentive eﬃciency deﬁned by [12] for the case of interim (Byesian) incentive
and feasibility constraints. [12] instantly discard the ex post incentive eﬃciency as unavailing on the
grounds that at the ex post stage all the information is known so that there is presumably no longer
any need to consider the informational constraints. However, if one is to compare incentive-feasible
allocations to other incentive-feasible allocations, then the ex post incentive eﬃciency, or the ex post
constrained optimality in the present environment, describes the set of allocation rules which are
undominated when this comparison is eﬀected at the ex post stage.
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The questions addressed here have a clear parallel in a Bayesian setting, where
the details of traders’ information do matter. Under the Bayesian informational
assumptions, speciﬁcally, the common prior, [16] provided a method to ﬁnd the
optimal ex ante incentive eﬃcient mechanisms for bilateral trade and showed that
in the speciﬁc example such a mechanism may arise as an equilibrium of a natural
double-auction game. By deriving the minimal expected informational rent to each
trader implied by the traders’ incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints [16]
showed that eﬃcient bilateral trade is impossible: the social surplus does not suﬃce
to incentivize the traders to reveal their private information; as a result trade is
sometimes not eﬀected when that would have been ex post eﬃcient. This is of course
also true in the present case as robustness is more diﬃcult to satisfy. In an example
when traders’ priors are uniform and symmetric, [16] then showed that an equilibrium
of a double-auction game studied by [6], which results in equal sharing of the surplus,
attains the eﬃciency bound. In the present setting, a similar statement is true
much more generally: the pricing mechanisms here arise naturally as equilibria of a
continuous-time double-auction game, where a mediator only reveals bids to traders
once they are compatible and trade is realized, see [10]. The eﬃciency measure
considered by [16] is the ex ante incentive eﬃciency, which was proposed by [12].
Here, the eﬃciency measure is the ex post constrained optimality, proposed by [8]
along the lines of [12].
When considering aggregation of information, one may view the results here as
somewhat negative: in a posted price not much information gets aggregated beyond
the fact that both traders were willing to trade at that price. One may also take a
more descriptive perspective: posted prices are so common precisely because they
are robust and optimal, at least in the static setting considered here. But the results
here might perhaps be most useful from a normative perspective: the complete
characterization of the ex post frontier of robust trading mechanisms may serve as a
tool for applications to more speciﬁc ex ante welfare criteria consistent with robust
analysis. Such is for example the regret-free criterion considered by [4] in a simpler
setting with one-sided private information. Under any such ex ante welfare criterion,
the optimal pricing mechanism must be some randomized (possibly deterministic)
posted price.7 Solving for an optimum within the set of randomized posted prices is a
considerable simpliﬁcation relative to optimizing the social welfare criterion subject
to the incentive and feasibility constraints.
7In order to maximize any ex ante welfare criterion, a mechanism must be ex post constrained
optimal.
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2 Deﬁnitions and theorem
A seller, 1, and a buyer, 2, bargain over the price of an indivisible good. We denote
by v1 the seller’s cost of producing the good, and by v2 the buyer’s value of the good.
We assume that at the time of trade, each trader knows her own type (valuation)
vi, but doesn’t know the type of the other trader. It is common knowledge that
pairs of types v = (v1, v2) are drawn from (0, 1)
2 according to some joint probability
distribution function F , with support(F ) = (0, 1)2, and such that F is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. While the support of F is common
knowledge, F is not common knowledge so that the details of F are not known to
the traders, or any other entity, such as a social planner or a mechanism designer.8
Denote by  ∈ {0, 1} the allocation of the good, where  = 1 if the object is
transferred to the buyer – there is trade, and  = 0 if there is no trade. When
the allocation is , the payment from the buyer to the seller is p ∈ (0, 1), and the
valuations are (v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)2, the payoﬀ to trader i is given by a utility function
ui(, p, vi), where for the seller, u1(p, v1) = p − v1, and for the buyer, u2(, p, v2) =
v2 − p. This is the standard case when traders are risk neutral and have additively
separable utility for money and the object.
A direct revelation mechanism μ is a mapping from traders’ reports v˜i ∈ (0, 1)
of their valuations into outcomes. An outcome is given by a lottery μ[v˜] over the
possible allocations of the good and prices, {0, 1} × (0, 1). That is, μ[v˜] is a lottery
that the traders face ex post, after they made reports (v˜1, v˜2) of their valuations to a
computer, or a broker. Therefore, a mechanism μ is a mapping,
μ : (0, 1)2 → Δ({0, 1} × (0, 1)) .
We assume that at the time of trade, each trader is allowed to step back if she ﬁnds the
terms of trade unfavorable. For example, the buyer will not make a payment unless
he obtains the good which he values at least as much as the payment. We also assume
that trade is not subsidized from an external source. Therefore, a trading mechanism
must satisfy ex post individual rationality and ex post budget balance. Additionally,
a robust trading mechanism must satisfy ex post incentive compatibility, that is,
reporting valuations truthfully must be an ex post Nash equilibrium.9
8For example, traders may have diﬀerent beliefs about F , and diﬀerent beliefs about the beliefs
of the other trader and so on, i.e., any type space is allowed, see [3]. The analysis here easily
generalizes to the case where the support of F is given by (v, v) × (v, v) , v < v, as well as to the
case when the support of F is closed; the assumption that the support of F is open is made mainly
for notational convenience: when the price of the good is 0 that signiﬁes no trade.
9In a separable environment, ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to requiring that
the trading mechanism is interim (or Bayesian) incentive compatible on any type space, and in
particular, for any common prior distribution over payoﬀ types F , see [3] and also [14]. The
revelation principle holds (see, e.g., [15]) so that the restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is
without loss of generality.
5
A mechanism μ satisﬁes ex post budget balance and individual rationality if,10
support(μ[v]) ⊂ {(, p) | v1 ×  ≤ p ≤ v2 × }, ∀v ∈ (0, 1)2 .
Given a mechanism μ and reports v = (v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)2, denote by Eμ[v] the
expectation operator with respect to the probability measure μ[v]. Denote by Ω the
state space of realizations of lottery μ. By ex post individual rationality and budget
balance, we can let Ω = [0, 1). The state space Ω then represents all possible prices,
where price p = 0 signiﬁes no trade. Throughout, j denotes the trader other than i.
A mechanism μ is ex post incentive compatible if,
Eμ[vi,vj ]ui(, p, vi) ≥ Eμ[v˜i,vj ]ui(, p, vi), ∀v˜i, ∀vi, ∀vj, i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
Deﬁnition 1. A mechanism μ is a robust trading mechanism if it satisﬁes ex post
budget balance, individual rationality, and incentive compatibility.
Our main question is: what are the eﬃcient robust trading mechanisms? By
[16] it is evident that ex post eﬃcient mechanisms will in the present case not be
possible – any mechanism satisfying ex post incentive and participation constraints
also satisﬁes the interim incentive and participation constraints. Note also that under
the present constraints only one type of ex post ineﬃciency is possible: namely, no
trade occurring when it would be proﬁtable.
The eﬃciency concept here cannot rely on the details of the distribution F over
valuations since these details are not known. An appropriate concept of eﬃciency
is the ex post constrained eﬃciency. It is intimately related to the ex post incen-
tive eﬃciency of [12], adapted to the robust environment studied here, i.e., ex post
Pareto optimality under the ex post incentive and feasibility constraints.11 A robust
10A mechanism μ satisﬁes ex post budget balance, if, ∀v ∈ (0, 1)2, the payment received by the
seller is at most as much as the payment made by the buyer (note that here it is equal), and the
object is only transferred to the buyer if it has been produced by the seller, in any realization of
the lottery μ[v]. A mechanism μ satisﬁes ex post individual rationality, if, ∀v ∈ (0, 1)2, each trader
obtains a non-negative utility,
support(μ[v]) ⊂ {(, p) | p− v1 ×  ≥ 0, v2 × − p ≥ 0}.
The interpretation of ex post budget balance and individual rationality here is literal, in the sense
that these apply to any realization from the lottery μ[v], e.g., traders are allowed to walk away after
the allocation of the good and the prices have been determined.
11[12] discard the ex post incentive eﬃciency as unavailing on the grounds that at the ex post
stage all the information is known so that there is no longer any need to consider any informa-
tional constraints. However, if one is to compare incentive-feasible allocations to other incentive-
feasible allocations, then the ex post incentive eﬃciency, or, in the present environment, the ex
post constrained eﬃciency describes the set of allocation rules which are undominated under such
a comparison at the ex post stage. See also [8].
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trading mechanism is ex post constrained eﬃcient if there is no other robust trad-
ing mechanism which (weakly) improves the payoﬀs to both players for all draws of
their valuations. Therefore, an optimal robust trading mechanism lies on the ex post
Pareto frontier of all robust trading mechanisms.
Given a robust trading mechanism μ, denote by Uμi (v) the ex post payoﬀ to trader i
when valuations are v ∈ (0, 1)2,
Uμi (v) = Eμ[v]ui(, p, vi).
Given two robust trading mechanisms μ and μ′, μ′ ex post Pareto dominates μ if,
Uμ
′
i (v) ≥ Uμi (v), ∀v ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ {1, 2}, and there is a trader i ∈ {1, 2} and a subset
of types O ⊂ (0, 1)2, such that the Lebesgue measure of O is positive and,
Uμ
′
i (v) > U
μ
i (v), ∀v ∈ O.
Deﬁnition 2. A robust trading mechanism μ is optimal if there does not exist a
robust trading mechanism μ′ which ex post Pareto dominates μ.
Consider a posted price p¯. If the seller is willing to deliver the good to the buyer
in exchange for the payment of p¯, and the buyer is willing to pay p¯ in exchange for
the good, then trade is eﬀected; otherwise the buyer does not obtain the good and
no payment takes place. Formally,
μp¯[v] =
{
1{=1,p=p¯}, if v1 ≤ p¯ ≤ v2,
1{=0,p=0}, otherwise.
More generally, a posted price can be randomized so that there is a predetermined
lottery λ over prices in [0, 1), and a posted price is then randomly drawn according
to λ. Such a randomized posted price is given by,
μλ[v] =
{
λ(p¯)1{=1,p=p¯}, if v1 ≤ p ≤ v2,
λ(p¯)1{=0,p=0}, otherwise.
A randomized posted price is non wasteful if λ(p¯ = 0) = 0. Given two mechanisms
μ, μ′, we say that μ and μ′ are payoﬀ equivalent if,
Uμi (v) = U
μ′
i (v), ∀v ∈ (0, 1)2 .
Observe that two diﬀerent posted prices 0 < p¯ < p¯ < 1 do not ex post dominate
each other. It is also evident that two diﬀerent probability distributions over posted
prices do not dominate each other, unless either one assigns a non-zero probability
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to price 0.12 The insight of our main Theorem 1 is that there are no robust trad-
ing mechanisms which are more eﬃcient than such non-wasteful randomized posted
prices.
Theorem 1. A mechanism is an optimal robust trading mechanism if and only if it
is payoﬀ equivalent to a non-wasteful randomized posted price.
3 Proof
Our proof proceeds along measure-theoretic lines. For a robust trading mechanism
μ, we provide a payoﬀ equivalent mechanism given by the probability of transferring
the good, ϕ(v), and the expected price, conditional on the good being transferred
π(v). This payoﬀ-equivalent mechanism is also a robust trading mechanism, and ϕ
and π are both weakly monotone. We then approximate ϕ and π by simple functions,
construct the appropriate payoﬀ equivalent randomized posted price, and apply the
monotone convergence theorem (see, e.g., [17]) to prove that any robust trading
mechanism is payoﬀ equivalent to a randomized posted price. Finally, a randomized
posted price is ex post Pareto dominated if a positive probability is assigned to price
0, i.e., to no trade.13
In what follows, denote by Uμi (v; v˜i) the payoﬀ to trader i in a mechanism μ
when traders valuations are v ∈ (0, 1)2 but trader i reports v˜i (and trader j reports
vj truthfully),
Uμi (v; v˜i) = Eμ[v˜i,vj ]ui(, p, vi)
Lemma 1. Let a mechanism μ be ex post incentive compatible. Then Uμ1 (v) is
strictly decreasing in v1 whenever U
μ
1 (v) > 0, and U
μ
2 (v) is strictly increasing in v2
whenever Uμ2 (v) > 0.
Proof. We provide the proof for the seller. Let Uμ1 (v1, v2) > 0, for some 0 < v1 < v2
and let v˜1 < v1. Then μ[v] assigns a positive probability to some feasible prices, and
by strict monotonicity of u1 in v1, we have U
μ
1 (v1, v2; v˜1) > U
μ
1 (v1, v2; v1). By ex post
incentive compatibility,
Uμ(v˜1, v2; v˜1) ≥ Uμ(v1, v2; v˜1) > Uμ(v1, v2; v1).
12If we allowed valuations vi to belong to the closed interval [0, 1] then we could model such
wasteful randomized posted prices, for example, by assigning some probability to prices higher
than 1 or lower than 0. Nothing in our theorem would change, and the proofs would have to be
only slightly adapted.
13Note that in any randomized posted price there exist valuations v1, v2, 0 < v1 < v2 < 1,
such that the probability of no trade (price equal 0) is positive. The point is that in order for
a randomized posted price to be on the ex post Pareto frontier, such a randomized posted price
should be non-wasteful in that the probability of price 0 shouldn’t be positive a priori but only as
a result of positive probability of some unfortunate draws of valuations.
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Lemma 2. Let a mechanism μ be ex post incentive compatible and let μ′ be payoﬀ-
equivalent to μ. Then μ′ is ex post incentive compatible.
Proof. Take a v ∈ (0, 1)2, v1 < v2, and by payoﬀ equivalence of μ and μ′,
Eμ[v]p− v1Eμ[v] = Eμ′[v]p− v1Eμ′[v],
v2Eμ[v]− Eμ[v]p = v2Eμ′[v]− Eμ′[v]p,
so that, Eμ[v] = Eμ′[v]. Now take v˜1 > v1, and by ex post incentive compatibility of
μ,
Uμ1 (v)− Uμ1 (v; v˜1) = Uμ1 (v)− Uμ1 (v˜1, v2)− (v˜1 − v1)Eμ[v˜1,v2] ≥ 0.
Since Uμ
′
1 (v) = U
μ
1 (v), U
μ′
1 (v˜1, v2) = U
μ
1 (v˜1, v2), and Eμ[v˜1,v2] = Eμ′[v˜1,v2], ex post in-
centive compatibility of μ′ for the seller follows. Similarly, we prove ex post incentive
compatibility of μ′ for the buyer. 
Given a robust trading mechanism μ, let ϕ(v) = Eμ[v] = μ[v]({ = 1}), and
π(v) = Eμ[v]p, so that ϕ(v) is the probability that the good is allocated to the
buyer, and π(v) is the expected price faced by trader i. Note that by ex post budget
balance and individual rationality, the price can only be positive whenever the object
is allocated, so that,
π(v) =
{
Eμ[v](p |  = 1), if μ({ = 1}) > 0,
0, otherwise.
We can therefore write,
Uμi (v) = μ[v]({ = 1})ui (1, π(v), vi) = ϕ(v)ui (1, π(v), vi) ,
that is,
Uμ1 (v) = ϕ(v) (π(v)− v1) , and, Uμ2 (v) = ϕ(v) (v2 − π(v)) , ∀v ∈ (0, 1)2 .
The mechanism μ is payoﬀ equivalent to (ϕ, π). By Lemma 2, since μ is ex post
incentive compatible, (ϕ, π) is also ex post incentive compatible. Moreover, since
μ satisﬁes ex post budget balance and individual rationality, (ϕ, π) also satisﬁes ex
post budget balance and individual rationality, so that (ϕ, π) is a robust trading
mechanism. Note that the functions ϕ, π are measurable on Ω = [0, 1) (recall that Ω
is the state space of all possible prices for the lottery μ). Note also that by Lemma
1, ϕ(., .) is weakly decreasing in v1 and weakly increasing in v2, and π(., .) is weakly
increasing in v1 and in v2. The next Proposition 1 generalizes the main results in
[11] and is key to our main theorem.
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Proposition 1. Let (ϕ, π) be a robust trading mechanism. Then there exists a
probability distribution λ over prices [0, 1), s.t.,
ϕ(v) = Prλ (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) , (3)
π(v) = Eλ (ω | ω ∈ [v1, v2]) . (4)
Proof. Until further notice, we assume that (ϕ, π) is a robust trading mechanism,
we ﬁx a v2 ∈ (0, 1), and denote,
ϕ˜v2(.) = ϕ(., v2),
π˜v21 (.) = π(., v2).
We proceed by proving the following claims for the seller; analogous claims can be
proven for the buyer.
1. π˜v21 (.) is a simple function if and only if ϕ˜
v2(.) is a simple function.
2. If π˜v21 (.) and ϕ˜
v2(.) are simple functions, then there exists a probability distri-
bution λv2 on {0} × (0, v2], such that,
ϕ˜v2(v1) = Prλv2 (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) ,
π˜v21 (v1) = Eλv2 (ω | ω ∈ [v1, v2]) .
3. If π˜v21 (.) and ϕ˜
v2(.) are measurable on (0, 1), then there exists a probability
distribution λv2 on {0} × (0, v2], such that,
ϕ˜v2(v1) = Prλv2 (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) ,
π˜v21 (v1) = Eλv2 (ω | ω ∈ [v1, v2]) .
Proof of Claims 1 and 2.
Step 1. ϕ˜v2(.) ∈ {0, α}, for some α ∈ (0, 1], if and only if, π˜v21 (.) ∈ {0, p¯}, for some
p¯ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, ϕ˜v2(v1) = α, π˜v21 (v1) = p¯, if and only if, v1 ∈ (0, p¯].
Proof. Suppose π˜v21 (.) ∈ {0, p¯}. If π˜v21 (v1) = 0, then by ex post individual rationality
and budget balance ϕ˜v2(v1) = 0. If π˜
v2
1 (v1) = π˜
v2
1 (v˜1) = p¯, v1 > v˜1, then by ex post
incentive compatibility, ϕ˜v2(v1) = ϕ˜
v2(v˜1), or v1 would have incentives to misreport
to v˜1. By ex post individual rationality and budget balance ϕ˜
v2(v1) = α, for some
α ∈ (0, 1].
If ϕ˜v2(v1) = 0, then by ex post individual rationality and budget balance (taking
into account the individual rationality of trader 2), π˜v21 (v1) = 0.
Suppose ϕ˜v2(v1) = α. Then π˜
v2
1 (v1) ≥ v1, by ex post individual rationality. If
π˜v21 (v1) = v1, then, by ex post incentive compatibility, ϕ˜
v2(v˜1) = α and π˜
v2
1 (v˜1) = v1,
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∀v˜1 < v1, and ϕ˜v2(v˜1) = 0 and π˜v21 (v˜1, v2) = 0, ∀v˜1 > v1. If π˜v21 (v1) > v1, then, by ex
post incentive compatibility, ϕ˜v2(v˜1) = α and π˜
v2
1 (v˜1) = π˜
v2
1 (v1), ∀v˜1 ∈ (0, v1].
Step 2. ϕ˜v2(.) ∈ {0, α1, ..., αK}, for some {α1, ..., αK} ⊂ (0, 1], αk > αk+1, k < K, if
and only if, π˜v21 (.) ∈ {0, p1, ..., pK}, for some {p1, ..., pK} ⊂ (0, 1), pk < pk+1, k < K.
Moreover, ϕ˜v2(v1) = αk+1, π˜
v2
1 (v1) = pk+1, if and only if, v1 ∈ (p¯k, p¯k+1], where,
pk =
αk − αk+1
αk
p¯k +
αk+1
αk
pk+1, k < K, and pK = p¯K . (5)
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows as in Step 1, i.e., by ex post individual rationality
and budget balance ϕ˜v2(.) > 0, if and only if π˜v21 (.) > 0, and by ex post incentive
compatibility, ϕ˜v2(.) is constant, if and only if, π˜v21 (.) is constant.
That pK = p¯K follows from ex post incentive compatibility for type v1 = p¯K . Now
take types v1 = p¯k, k < K, and v˜1 = v1+ ,  > 0. By ex post incentive compatibility
for v1,
αk(pk − p¯k) ≥ αk+1(pk+1 − p¯k),
and by ex post incentive compatibility for v˜1,
αk+1(pk+1 − p¯k − ) ≥ αk(pk − p¯k − ).
Let  → 0, and combine the last two inequalities to obtain,
αk(pk − p¯k) = αk+1(pk+1 − p¯k),
which yields (5).
Step 3. If ϕ˜v2(.) and π˜v21 (.) are simple functions, then there exist prices, p¯k ≤ v2,
0 < k ≤ K, 0 < p¯1 < ... < p¯k, and weights λk > 0, 0 < k ≤ K, s.t.,
∑K
1 λk ≤ 1, and,
ϕ˜v2(v1) =
∑
k>0,v1≤p¯k
λk,
π˜v21 (v1) =
1∑
k>0,v1≤p¯k λk
( ∑
k>0,v1≤p¯k
λkp¯k
)
.
Proof. Deﬁne αK+1 = 0. By applying (5) from Step 2 recursively, we obtain,
pk =
k′=K∑
k′=k
p¯k′
αk′ − αk′+1
αk
,
and by letting λk = αk − αk+1, k ∈ {1, ..., K}, we obtain the desired expressions.
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Finally note that p¯K ≤ v2, by the ex post budget balance and individual rationality
of trader 2. This concludes the proof of Claims 1 and 2.
Proof of Claim 3.
By ex post incentive compatibility, ϕ˜v2(.) and π˜v21 (.) are monotone (Lemma 1). Next,
for each k > 0 and k′ ∈ {1, ..., k}, let αkk′ = ϕ˜v2
(
k′v2
k
)
. Deﬁne a simple function
ϕ˜v2,k(.) by,
ϕ˜v2,k(v1) = α
k
k′ , v1 ∈
(
(k′ − 1)v2
k
,
k′v2
k
]
.
Therefore, {ϕ˜v2,k(.)}k>0 is a monotone increasing sequence of functions, converging
point-wise to ϕ˜v2(.). For each k > 0 let π˜v2,k1 (.) be such that ϕ˜
v2,k(.), π˜v2,k1 (.) satisfy
ex post incentive compatibility, and ϕ˜v2,k(.) > 0 if and only if π˜v2,k1 (.) > 0. Then
{π˜v2,k1 (.)}k>0 is also a monotone increasing sequence, converging point-wise to π˜v21 (.).
By Claim 2, for each k > 0, there is a probability distribution over λv2,k on {0} ×
(0, v2], such that,
ϕ˜v2,k(v1) = Prλv2,k (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) ,
π˜v2,k1 (v1) = Eλv2,k (ω | ω ∈ [v1, v2]) .
Let λv2 be the point-wise limit of λv2,k. By the monotone convergence theorem (see
e.g., Rudin 1987),
ϕ˜v2(v1) = Prλv2 (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) ,
π˜v21 (v1) = Eλv2 (ω | ω ∈ [v1, v2]) .
This concludes the proof of Claim 3.
Similarly, we prove analogous claims for the buyer, so that, for each v1 ∈ (0, 1),
there exists a λv1 , such that,
ϕ˜v1(v2) = Prλv1 (ω ∈ [v1, v2])
π˜v12 (v2) = Eλv1 (ω | ω ∈ [v1, v2])
Now take a v ∈ (0, 1). By above,
ϕ(v) = Prλv2 (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) = Prλv1 (ω ∈ [v1, v2]) ,
so that λv2 and λv1 must coincide almost everywhere and do not depend (respectively)
on either v2 or v1. Let λ ≡ λv2 , which concludes the proof. 
Our main theorem now follows from the next Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. A randomized posted price λ is optimal, if and only if, Prλ ((0, 1)) = 1.
Proof. Take a randomized posted price λ, such that, Prλ ((0, 1)) = α < 1 and
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Prλ ({0}) = 1 − α, i.e., λ assigns a positive mass to price 0. Deﬁne a probability
distribution over prices by λ¯(x) = 1
α
λ(x)− 1+α, ∀x ∈ [0, 1). Evidently, λ¯(x) ex post
Pareto dominates λ. The converse follows from Proposition 1. 
4 Discussion
Why is it useful to know the set of optimal robust trading mechanisms? Consider a
case in which the social planner knows the distribution of players’ valuations F . Then
the planner can ﬁnd, for instance, the robust trading mechanism that maximizes the
ex ante expected sum of traders’ utilities. More generally, given F , what is the
ex ante Pareto frontier of robust trading mechanism? The characterization from
Theorem 1 is useful: every ex ante optimal robust trading mechanism must lie on
the ex post Pareto frontier. In particular, for a given F and weights in the social
welfare function, the ex ante optimal robust trading mechanism is a deterministic
posted price.
Example 1. Suppose that the traders’ valuations are identically and independently
distributed according to a continuous probability distribution function F , with a
density f . Then the ex-ante optimal robust trading mechanism which maximizes
the sum of traders’ utilities is given by a deterministic posted price p∗, where,
p∗ = arg max
p¯∈(0,1)
∫ p¯
0
∫ 1
p¯
((v2 − v1)f(v2)dv2) f(v1)dv1.
For instance, when F is uniform on (0, 1), p∗ = 1
2
.
That p∗ must be deterministic follows from the fact that the derivative of the
expression on the right hand side is positive at 0, decreasing, and negative at 1.
Therefore, there exists a unique posted price that maximizes the sum of traders’
utilities ex ante, and randomizing over other prices would only decrease the sum of
traders’ expected payoﬀs.
One can similarly surmise that any weighted sum of traders’ utilities is maximized
by some deterministic posted price. Therefore, for a given F , the ex-ante Pareto
frontier is given by a subset of deterministic posted prices, where the upper bound of
this set is derived when the social welfare criterion assigns all the weight to the seller,
and the lower bound when all the weight is assigned to the buyer. Our results can
also be applied to other welfare criteria, for example, the minimax regret criterion.
Under any such welfare criterion, the corresponding optimal mechanism must lie on
the ex post Pareto frontier.14
14In the one-sided asymmetric information problem, [4] consider a seller who faces a buyer with
an unknown valuation, and the buyer chooses a pricing rule to minimize regret, which results in a
distribution over prices.
13
In a related point, our characterization allows for a comparison of ex ante welfare
under the interim and the ex post constraints. Relative to the Bayesian setting,
what is the loss in welfare due to the traders not knowing the details of distribution
over the valuations? For example, suppose that F was in fact uniform. By [16], in
a Bayesian setting, under the interim constraints, the expected gains from trade are
maximized when traders trade with certainty as long as v2 exceeds v1 by at least
1
4
.
Then the expected gains from trade are 9
32
. In contrast, the optimal robust trading
mechanism (assuming that somehow the social planner knew F ) that maximizes
gains from trade under the uniform distribution is a deterministic posted price at 1
2
and the corresponding expected gains from trade are 1
8
. Therefore 5
32
, or more than
half of the expected surplus, is lost due to the traders’ more limited knowledge.
As a ﬁnal comment, if the support of traders valuations were not known, as might
perhaps be a more realistic assumption, then randomized posted prices might have
to be wasteful. We hope that this might be investigated in the future advances on
the problem of bilateral trade.
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